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S

tate public pension plans, mostly
defined benefit plans, cover pension
benefits for 12.8 million active public
employees and 5.9 million retirees and
other annuitants.1 However, by the
end of 2009, public pension plans had
accumulated a total funding deficit of
$697 billion (measured by the difference
between actuarial pension assets and
liabilities). On average, public pension
funds cover 75 percent of their liabilities,
but individual state results vary greatly.
The 2008 stock market crash strongly
affected pension asset value in that equity
allocation on average accounted for 56
percent of invested assets. The average
2009 pension asset beta of 0.63 suggests
that if the market fell 35 percent (the drop
experienced during the 2008 financial
crisis), public plans would lose 22
percent of their total fund value.2
Therefore, an important yet largely
overlooked issue related to pension
underfunding is the investment risk
level assumed by public pension plans.
As shown in Figure 1, the state pension
funds equity allocation varied greatly at
the end of 2009, from 11 percent (South
Carolina) to 69 percent (Nebraska and
Mississippi). The current funding gap
prompts the question of whether the
pension fund managers will adopt riskier
investment positions in hopes of raising
returns and lowering the shortfall.3
This article summarizes our research
that is reported in our Upjohn Institute
working paper (Mohan and Zhang 2012).
In it, we examine the determinants
of pension risk-taking policy during
the period 2001–2009 after taking
into consideration state government
incentives, political pressure, fiscal

constraints, public union presence, and
workforce features.
Factors Affecting Pension Funds
Risk-Taking Policy
We measure pension risk as either
the percentage of total plan assets
invested in the equity market or pension
asset beta. The more risk assumed
by the fund manager (higher equity
allocation or higher asset beta), the
more sensitive the fund is to market
volatility. So, what are the factors that
could affect investment risk? One
incentive may be risk management.
When a pension fund is underfunded
the state is obligated to increase
contributions. Unexpected, required
funding for pension contributions may
reduce the ability to invest in schools
or police, for example, because in the
short run, the state/municipal budget
is fixed. The implications are that,
from a risk management perspective,
states would prefer to have predictable
pension contributions. Accordingly,
asset allocation decisions would be a
function of funding status—safe, wellfunded plans could invest in more risky
securities, while underfunded plans invest
in less risky assets. Alternatively, there
is a risk transfer element to consider:
taxpayers are ultimately responsible for
underfunded public pension plans, and
governments may raise taxes to fund
pension plans (Gold 2003).
Other factors may also affect risktaking investment policy. Public pension
plans have a unique set of issues to
consider: politics, fiscal constraints, and
public pension accounting. Political
influence could pressure the fund
to buy bonds issued by the state or
local government or to direct funds to
economically targeted investments.

And if these investments provide
inefficient returns, then remaining
assets may be invested in riskier
securities. Furthermore, if states face
fiscal limitations that restrict borrowing,
pension fund debt may act as a
substitute (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009).
Fiscal constraints also cause states to
manipulate actuarial assumptions to
lower required contributions (Eaton and
Nofsinger 2004). Public pension plans
are regulated by the government standard
(GASB 25), which allows liabilities to
be discounted at the assumed plan rate
of return, which most commonly is 8
percent. Higher assumed returns reduce
the discounted liabilities, which in turn
reduces the required contributions.
Accordingly, we label these factors
political influence, fiscal constraint, and
accounting effect.
Finally, we consider union
membership, demographic makeup of employees, and follow-theleader investment behavior. If union
membership is associated with higher
pension obligations, investment policy
could become riskier in order to chase
higher returns. From a demographic
perspective, age and gender of plan
participants may affect the risktaking policy of the fund. In addition,
investment managers tend to mimic
each other. According to Park (2009),
managers of public pension funds tend to
follow peer group norms such that asset
allocation to all equity hovers around
64–75 percent. Alternatively, public
pension plan managers may follow the
best performers or plans considered to be
large and influential, such as CalPERS.
We name these factors union effect,
demographic effect, and herding effect.
Summary of Our Results
We find that accounting standards
strongly affect public fund investment
risk, as higher return assumptions (used
to discount pension liabilities) are
associated with higher equity allocations
and betas. In particular, a 100 basis point
increase in pension return assumption
is associated with a 1.72–4.51 percent
increase in equity allocation. The
corresponding increase in pension asset
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beta given a same magnitude increase
in the return assumption is 0.04–0.06,
suggesting that an important incentive
for the fund manager is justifying the
liabilities discount rate.
Our results also suggest that public
funds assume more risk if they are
underfunded or have lower investment
returns in the previous year, evidence
consistent with risk transfer or intent to
pass underfunded pension obligations to
future taxpayers. This risk-taking policy
is not necessarily in the plan participants’
best interest. Taxpayers might ultimately
be called upon to close the funding gap.
When states are constrained from
issuing additional debt, underfunding
pension funds may substitute for
borrowing. And because states can justify
a higher discount rate for liabilities
through the assumed rate of return,
states facing financial constraints may
subsequently invest in riskier assets,
resulting in higher pension plan betas
and/or larger equity allocations. We
find that pension funds in states facing
financial constraints are more likely to
take higher risk in their pension fund
investment.
Our results suggest a degree of
follow-the-leader in that plan managers
tend to follow the risk-investing policy
of large and high-profile plans (such as
CalPERS). Furthermore, we report a
mild public union effect; that is, in order
to provide larger retirement benefits
for unionized public employees, fund
managers pursue a riskier investment
allocation. Finally, limited evidence
suggests that economically targeted
investment policies are associated with
lower pension investment risk.
Overall, our findings suggest that the
risk levels of public pension funds are
determined by various factors: incentives
to justify the accounting discount rate
choice, shifting pension risk to future
tax payers, and substituting underfunded
pension liabilities for borrowing. A first
step towards addressing the problem
would be to appropriately discount future
liabilities.
Notes
1. These figures are from November, 2011.
The most current figures, as of February
2012, are 13.2 million active and 7.1 million
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Figure 1 State Pension Plans Equity Allocation as of Fiscal Year 2009
< 45%
= 45–55%
= > 55%

SOURCE: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011).

retirees and other annuitants. Data available
from http://www.publicfundsurvey.org/
publicfundsurvey/scorecard.asp (accessed
March 6, 2012).
2. Beta measures the sensitivity of
financial asset returns to the overall stock
market change (i.e., using the S&P 500 index
as a proxy). Pension asset beta captures the
risk of a pension plan’s exposure to alternative
investments, including private equity, venture
capital, hedge funds, and other alternative
assets. It was first proposed by Jin, Merton,
and Bodie (2006).
3. Allocation to private equity funds
increased to 11 percent as of September 2011
(Corkery 2012).
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